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With the North Korean nuclear threat still lingering, the international community’s decades-
long effort to bring about peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was in vain. 
Although there were only a few optimistic moments for establishing a peace regime on 
the peninsula, no such mechanism has been created thus far. The Six-Party Talks’ last 
push for a permanent peace regime in late 2007, which was facilitated by the September 
19 Joint Statement and the February 13 Joint Agreement, was as close as we could come. 
Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy of engagement, Roh Moo-hyun’s unreserved outreach 
to North Korea, and Lee Myung-bak’s stern response to the North’s nuclear program and 
provocations all proved to be fruitless to induce changes in North Korea. There seems to be 
no escape from the treacherous repetitive patterns in dealing with Pyongyang. This is the 
sobering legacy that Park Geun-hye inherited from her predecessors.
Park had to begin her presidency facing harsh realities. Even before she took office in late 
February 2013, North Korea launched a series of provocative actions: its third nuclear test, 
another missile test, withdrawal from the 1953 armistice and the non-aggression pact with 
the South, severance of the North-South military hotline, closure of the Kaeseong industrial 
complex, massive cyber-attacks, and numerous rhetorical threats. In September, the factories 
at Kaeseong restarted operations, and Pyongyang made several conciliatory gestures, 
including resumption of the reunion program for families separated by the Korean War amid 
talk of re-opening tours at Mt. Kumgang for South Koreans that stopped in 2008 when a South 
Korean tourist was shot by a North Korean soldier. However, the North abruptly canceled 
plans for the reunions, blaming the conservatives in the South for “throwing obstacles” in 
the inter-Korean reconciliatory process.1 A more surprising development unfolded in early 
December 2013, when Jang Sung-taek, uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who was 
second-in-command, was suddenly arrested and later reportedly executed. The year ended 
with the lowest expectations for inter-Korean relations.
Beginning the year 2014, Kim Jong-un called for creating “an atmosphere of reconciliation 
and unity” on the peninsula. Seoul replied that it wanted to see action not rhetoric and 
stated that family reunions would be a first step for forging inter-Korean reconciliation.2 
On February 12, the first high-level talks in seven years were held at the truce village 
of Panmunjom, with family reunions, South Korea-U.S. military exercises, and tours of 
Mt. Kumgang on the agenda; however, Pyongyang demanded that Seoul postpone joint 
military drills with the United States as a precondition for the reunions. Seoul refused, 
claiming that the humanitarian agenda should not be linked to military issues. Later, both 
sides agreed that they would suspend hostile rhetoric toward each other and resume the 
reunions despite the upcoming joint exercise. Yet, on March 25, North Korea launched two 
medium-range ballistic missiles. It also harshly criticized Park’s “Dresden Declaration” of 
March 28 on taking Germany’s unity as an example and model for a peaceful reunification 
of the peninsula and laying the groundwork for reunification through economic and cultural 
exchanges and humanitarian aid as the “psychopath’s daydream” and “bits of useless junk.”3 
Indeed, inter-Korean relations have long been a seesaw, with North Korea’s repetitive cycle 
of provocations followed by weak international sanctions and its conciliatory initiatives that 
often ended abruptly with little progress.4
Despite the strained relationship with North Korea during the first months after her inauguration 
in 2013, Park pursued “Hanbando shinroe” (Korea Peninsula trust-building process), putting 
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emphasis on the importance of maintaining dialogue, honoring every promise that has already 
been made, and abiding by international norms. “Trustpolitik” is known to be an expression 
of Park’s philosophy based on historical experience that sustainable cooperation among states 
requires both trust and awareness of the realities of the peninsula and Northeast Asia. In 
addition, the “Dongbuka pyonghwa gusang” (Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative: 
NAPCI) was proposed as a roadmap to carry out trustpolitik at the regional level and shift 
from current mistrust and rivalry driven by “Asia’s Paradox” (strengthening regional economic 
interdependence, which is offset by an escalation in territorial and historical disputes) into a 
new structure of trust-based cooperation and sustainable peace in the region.5 The Park 
administration has emphasized the difference between NAPCI and previous Northeast Asia 
initiatives that were proposed since President Roh Tae-woo in the late 1980s, stating that 
NAPCI intends to promote a culture of regional cooperation through building trust and aims to 
accumulate habits and practices of dialogue and cooperation starting with soft security issues.6
Park’s approach has induced no real change in de facto nuclear North Korea. In fact, the 
North’s pacifying gestures in 2014 (although it still fired missiles and slammed Park’s 
reunification speech in March) compared to 2013 seem not to be drawn from Park’s “resolute 
and principled” management, but are more closely related to the North Korean domestic 
situation. In 2013, the second year of his reign, Kim Jong-un seemed to be desperate to achieve 
real discernible results so as to legitimize the third generation of the Kim family’s dynastic 
rule. Because of this internal situation, Park had difficulties in pursuing her North Korean 
policy. As quoted in a Daily NK interview with a North Korean expert, “North Korea may 
respond better to South Korean policy changes in 2014 as it aims to improve relations with 
the U.S. and China.”7 Recently, Pyongyang has pursued the strategy of “Tongnam Tongmi” 
(setting up a relationship with the United States through enhancing its relationship with South 
Korea) instead of the long-held strategy of “Tongmi Bongnam” (trying to set up a relationship 
with the United States while insulting and refusing a relationship with South Korea).8
Against this backdrop, this chapter evaluates Park’s North Korean policy through the lens 
of both checkered inter-Korean relations and complex regional settings. She advocated 
trustpolitik as an approach to assume “a tough line against North Korea sometimes, and 
a flexible policy open to negotiations other times.” It has the appearance of a “Goldilocks 
approach,” a middle-of-the-road policy, taking no aggressive actions and not being too 
passive or too generous, which is similar to what many say about Obama’s foreign policy.9 
Park’s administration appears to have taken lessons from ineffective policies of her 
predecessors, whether a progressive Sunshine Policy or Lee Myong-bak’s frosty responses 
to North Korea’s “bad behavior” which did not lead to peace and security on the peninsula.
After more than one year of promotional efforts, however, Park’s catchphrases of 
trustpolitik and NAPCI still suffer conceptual vagueness and lack tangible policy 
guidelines. The essence of trustpolitik is subject to some interpretation and criticism for 
not yet having much perceptible content. Also, Park’s Goldilocks approach is subject to 
criticism, as is Obama’s, as unable to take any decisive move in either direction. The 
challenging regional security situation limits Seoul’s strategic freedom of action, making 
its North Korean policy reactive, rather than proactive, and heavily affected by the great 
powers and Pyongyang’s precarious actions, which, as earlier in the nuclear crisis, often 
proved to be beyond a South Korean president’s grasp.10
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 Trustpolitik as Political Philosophy 
and a Policy Tool
Since Park Geun-hye first introduced the basics of trustpolitik in her article in Foreign 
Affairs, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang,” in the 
fall of 2011, it has been perceived by many as a rather ambiguous policy concept.11 With 
the launch of her regime, the South Korean foreign policy elite, especially the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), has been diligently explaining the meaning and significance of 
this concept and converting it into a workable policy platform, making ever more detailed 
policy explanations. According to Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, trustpolitik is a vision, 
philosophy, and policy by which South Korea, as a responsible middle power, can pursue 
the Korean Peninsula trust-building process and NAPCI.12 This catchword appears to 
presuppose a philosophically driven policy initiative that is to encompass inter-Korean 
and regional affairs all together.
As the name itself suggests, “trust” is the core concept of trustpolitik. Nations, as individuals, 
need to trust each other in order to cooperate together. Though it may sound simple and 
almost self-evident, this is exactly where contending theoretical paradigms of international 
politics differ in their perspectives and prescriptions. Realists are inclined to see the notion 
of building trust among nations as either impossible or implausible, whereas liberals tend to 
embrace it as both feasible and desirable. Minister Yun argues that trustpolitik is “neither a 
utopian idealism that shies away from realpolitik nor a naïve political romanticism.”13
To those who advocate trustpolitik, Park’s North Korean policy is a reasonable combination 
of carrots and sticks. They evaluate the normalization of the Kaeseong industrial complex 
after a five-month shutdown by the North as a tangible outcome of Park’s new policy 
that sticks to a consistent stance, urging Pyongyang to respect international standards and 
norms and abide by its promises, or otherwise pay a penalty for broken promises, which 
is the key element of trustpolitik. It also demonstrates the possibility of a paradigm shift 
in inter-Korean relations because it marks the first time that Seoul has departed from its 
past practice of either easily accepting or helplessly enduring North Korea’s self-indulgent 
behavior. Meanwhile, Seoul’s decision to allow humanitarian assistance to North Korea via 
international organizations such as UNICEF is also in line with one of the central tenets of 
trustpolitik. The policy supports the provision of assistance to the most vulnerable North 
Koreans, such as infants and pregnant women, regardless of the political situation between 
the two Koreas.14
As far as the policy nametag is concerned, trustpolitik seems to echo Roh Tae-woo’s opportune 
and fairly effective stratagem of nordpolitik; however, the two initiatives are readily 
distinguishable. While nordpolitik mainly focused on geopolitically and diplomatically 
encircling North Korea by taking advantage of the dissolution of the communist bloc in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, trustpolitik aims at laying a solid foundation for meaningful inter-
Korean rapprochement as well as regional cooperation. Also, interestingly, there appears to 
be no geopolitical notion or regional focus in trustpolitik. Instead, it is to emphasize strong 
philosophical principles that demonstrate South Korea’s superior moral ground. This is quite 
a departure from her predecessors’ rather grandiose diplomatic slogans.
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In retrospect, during the Cold War period, Korea tried to develop its strategic thought toward 
regionalism, although it was somewhat restrained and distorted. Based on the firm bilateral 
alliance structure with the United States, Korean diplomatic leverage and choices were 
limited in the region’s multilateral process. Its regional strategy was distorted to some extent 
because the primary objective of its foreign policy was to gain relative predominance over 
North Korea in ideological, political, diplomatic, and economic terms. Post-Cold War efforts 
of regional cooperation among Northeast Asian countries have produced mixed outcomes, 
or what Park called “Asia’s paradox,” with growing economic interdependence but little 
political and security cooperation. This reflects the fact that the functionalist approach does 
Table 1. Comparison of South Korea’s Successive Governments’ Regional  
                Initiatives
Presidents Initiatives Major Characteristics
Roh Tae-woo
(1988-1993)
Nordpolitik
Opening to the former communist countries 
and initiatives for inter-Korean reconciliation
Kim Young-
sam (1993-
1998)
Globalization
Advancing outreach to East Asia and the rest 
of the world, with aims to have a positive 
spillover effect on North Korea
Kim Dae-jung
(1998-2003)
East Asia Initiative
Taking initiative in the East Asian community 
building process (e.g. East Asia Vision Group, 
East Asia Study Group), seeking cooperation 
on traditional security issues, and employing 
a top-down approach based on political 
agreements between heads of states
Roh Moo-hyun 
(2003-008)
Northeast Asian 
Cooperation Initiative
Establishing Northeast Asia security and 
economic communities that include regional 
cooperation on non-traditional security 
agendas, and seeking a “balancing” role in 
international relations in Northeast Asia.
Lee Myung-
bak (2008-
2012)
Creative, Pragmatic 
Diplomacy
Strengthening relations with key regional 
powers, promoting conditional engagement 
with North Korea, and enhancing Korea's role 
in the international community
Park Geun-hye 
(2013-present)
Trustpolitik; Northeast 
Asia Peace and 
Cooperation Initiative
Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation 
Initiative. Building trust between the two 
Koreas by striking a balance between 
sternness and flexibility, focusing on consistent 
international alliances against North Korea 
(especially for the dismantlement of the 
North’s nuclear program), promoting a 
culture of regional cooperation grounded in 
trust, accumulating practices and habits of 
dialogue and cooperation starting with softer 
issues, and building trust through concrete 
cooperation projects
226   |   Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
not work well in advancing the regional integration process in this region. Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun advocated “open regionalism,” assuring that Northeast Asian regional 
cooperation will not be exclusive and discriminatory against countries outside the region, 
but rather play a catalytic role for broader regional cooperation, which embraces the rest of 
the region.15 Yet, their respective regional strategies were considered to be an inward-looking 
protectionist approach in economic terms, as well as heavily associated with their North 
Korean policies.16
During Lee Myung-bak’s administration, dealing with U.S. attitudes toward multilateral 
initiatives such as ASEAN + 3 and the East Asian Summit (EAS), which did not include the 
United States, was an arduous concern in strategic planning to develop regional cooperation. 
As Washington expressed its continued reservations about evolving East Asia regionalism, it 
was difficult for Seoul to disregard its views because of the geopolitical reality in and around 
the peninsula. Lee was eager to promote “greater Asian diplomacy,” through the expansion 
of an Asian cooperative network based on open regionalism. His pledge for reconciliation 
with Japan on the basis of trilateral cooperation involving the United States was an important 
step toward regional cooperation, although his proposal did not come to fruition. Lee’s 
so-called creative, pragmatic diplomacy gave priority to strengthening the U.S. strategic 
alliance, emphasizing its usefulness for Korea’s national interest, and his strategic thinking 
on regionalism could not be developed at the cost of Seoul’s relationship with Washington.17
In comparison, Park has sought a “G-2” strategy of balanced and harmonious relations with 
both the United States and China. While retaining South Korea’s traditional alliance, Park is 
attempting to develop a strategic partnership with China in dealing with the denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula and trade. Her administration claims that successful summits with 
both countries were possible due to a mutual sense of trust between the leaders.18 How South 
Korea, a middle power, can position itself well to secure its national interests in the face of 
the rivalry between giant powers is a thorny task. As U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden in his 
visit to Korea in December 2013 stated, “Betting on the opposite side of the United States 
would not be a great bet.” Noticing Seoul’s growing ties with Beijing, he may be reminding 
the Park administration that it wants Korea’s support in Washington’s rebalancing foreign 
policy.19 Given this reality, Park’s NAPCI attempts to reflect on the lessons learned from the 
previous administrations’ struggles for regional initiatives by emphasizing the importance of 
making cooperation projects and dialogues executable and achievable.20
As for the perception of Pyongyang toward South Korean presidents, it seems to have been 
less critical of Park than Lee. According to a preliminary study on North Korea’s media 
content by Martin Weiser,21 peaks in references to Lee in March and July/August 2012 
coincided with military exercises that began in March and August and the celebration of the 
end of the Korean War. Despite the fierce rhetoric in the spring of 2013 and the numerous 
references to the Korean War in August, references to Park remained less frequent. This 
trend in the coverage of South Korean presidents started in mid-2012, before Park took 
office, and might point at North Korea’s willingness to engage the South after only a few 
months of vitriol following the death of Kim Jong-il. This shows that the third nuclear crisis 
was linked by North Korea more to the United States while paying less attention to Seoul for 
a stern response by the UN. Still, North Korea closed the Kaeseong complex at the beginning 
of April, not long after the war rhetoric rose sharply in March (See Figure 1).
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North Korean media paid virtually no attention to Park after her inauguration in February 
2013 and started to mention her more frequently only in the cabinet’s newspaper Minju 
Choson in June and July, dropping again in August. Rodong Sinmun, which has a broader 
domestic audience as the party’s newspaper, included surprisingly few references to her. 
Having criticized Lee immediately after his election, it took a “wait and see” attitude in 
the case of Park. As South Korean-U.S.-Japanese joint naval drills involving a U.S. aircraft 
carrier in South Korean waters heightened tensions with North Korea in October, references 
to Park increased; however, Pyongyang clearly was less critical of her (See Figure 1).
This lesser attention given to Park in North Korean media may not be a surprise, given the 
fact that Lee clearly took a harder line with the North, a policy the United States supported 
at that time, and given Park’s “middle of the road policy.” Yet, Pyongyang’s response has 
been less unforgiving even when Park clearly rejected the North’s requests, such as holding 
the family reunions only after cancelling the Foal Eagle exercises. Arguably, Pyongyang’s 
reaction to Park is somewhat related to North Korea’s memory of her father Park Chung-
hee’s statement of July 4, 1970 that led to an agreement with North Korean leader Kim 
Il-sung, grandfather of Kim Jong-un, as well as to her 2002 visit to Pyongyang to meet 
Kim Jong-il, father of Kim Jong-un. In addition, after a series of violent provocations and 
threats until the first half of 2013, Pyongyang seemed to employ conciliatory gestures and 
policies in order to go forward with diplomatic engagement with Seoul, and ultimately with 
Washington, which is known as the policy of “Tongnam Tongmi.” In February 2014, the two 
Koreas held reunions of families separated by the Korean War, despite the Korea-U.S. joint 
military exercise. Initially, the North demanded a delay in joint military drills until after the 
reunion finished, but the South refused and, in a very rare concession, the North agreed to 
hold the family reunions as scheduled. This raised hopes for improved inter-Korean relations, 
but Pyongyang has increased tensions again by testing short-range ballistic missiles and 
rockets and rejected Seoul’s proposal to hold Red Cross talks to discuss arranging more 
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family reunions in March. Recently, the North Korean media have also noticeably raised its 
criticism against Park, particularly in the wake of the Foal Eagle exercise, a two-month long 
Korea-U.S. joint military drill aimed at improving combat readiness against North Korea, 
and Parks’ Dresden Proposal.
In brief, trustpolitik, whether as Park’s overarching political philosophy or as a policy tool 
that is applicable both to inter-Korean relations and international diplomacy, is based on 
the hope of establishing a community in which members feel a sense of trustworthiness 
with each other. In implementing trustpolitik since she came to office, Park has diligently 
explained her political viewpoint related to NAPCI to other countries. She claimed that 
the trust-building process on the peninsula and NAPCI are mutually reinforcing since 
the regional objectives of peaceful cooperation are to increase common interest and trust 
between the states involved, to offer opportunities for sustained dialogue and shared norms 
to facilitate one country’s understanding of and predictability about another state’s actions, 
and ultimately to foster a favorable environment for peaceful unification of the two Koreas. 
NAPCI is also considered a useful means to indirectly send a strong message to North Korea 
that the international community will respond to any military provocation.22
Still, the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia remains. As the existing bilateral security 
system is pivotal to regional peace and stability, the multilateral regional security system 
should serve as a complement to the current bilateral structure. Given a clear lack of inter-
state trust due to historical animosity, geopolitical complexity, and competitive military 
build-ups, Park’s emphasis on trust among nations is not only pertinent but also imperative 
to regional peace and security. However, given the realist assumption that nations have 
no eternal friends or enemies but only have permanent national interests in international 
relations, promoting a regional sense of sustainable trust among states, as well as managing 
inter-Korean relations based on trust, sounds both naïve and unfeasible. In an opinion poll in 
February 2014, 71.3 percent of 150 experts on diplomacy and security who responded to the 
survey said the Korean Peninsula trust-building process has no practical effect.23
Park in her NAPCI called for the promotion of multilateral cooperation that begins with 
less controversial regional common interests such as environmental problems, cross-border 
crimes, and anti-terrorism. The main objective of NAPCI is to increase the habit of dialogue 
and cooperation in these soft security sectors, which, in turn, would generate a spillover 
effect to more sensitive issues such as arms control, alliances, and historical and territorial 
disputes. Yet, critics argue that it is just an ambiguous goal that lacks concrete and practical 
ways of implementation.24 Furthermore, a functionalist approach envisioned in NAPCI 
appears to not be effective in the case of Northeast Asia, where geopolitical complications 
and urgency prevail, as shown in ongoing Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese bilateral 
tensions that have frustrated trilateral meetings. Strengthening cooperation on softer issues 
has not effectively generated necessary conditions for regional peace and security. Rather, 
tensions over “harder” political and military issues have disturbed inter-state functional 
cooperation already under way. Therefore, confidence-building measures on hard issues 
through a political breakthrough at the highest level are urgently required to regain a sense 
of momentum in support of bilateral and multilateral dialogue in the region.
Lee: South Korea’s Search for a New Diplomatic Strategy Toward North Korea    |   229
Challenging Security Environment  
in Northeast Asia
The world has witnessed a power shift in a changing world order, particularly since the 2008 
global financial crisis. Northeast Asia seems to be at the forefront of the transition. China’s 
rising economic power is being rapidly converted to formidable military capabilities and 
diplomatic influence. Japan’s push for achieving a normal state is already causing increased 
friction among the countries in the region. U.S. supremacy in the region is increasingly 
questionable despite the American diplomatic and military rebalancing to Asia.25 The 
economic worries may, to some degree, be fading away, but the geopolitical challenges are 
intensifying.26 In South Korea’s North Korean policy and regional diplomacy, the complex 
and uncertain regional background needs to be carefully considered.
North Korea: Oscillating Behavior Increases Uncertainty
Since the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011, there has been an apparent lack of 
consistency in North Korea’s behavior, recently even less predictable and more puzzling 
than usual. Last year it took a series of provocative actions and then suddenly went on 
a “peace offensive.” The periodic ups and downs in its rhetoric are now too frequent to 
discern what it wants, let alone what it truly intends to do. Back in February 2012, there 
was cautious expectation that the long overdue promises at the Six-Party Talks might be 
fulfilled step-by-step if the process resumed, as the “Leap Day” deal was reached between 
the United States and North Korea. North Korea had pledged to allow the IAEA inspectors 
to assess and monitor the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and suspend nuclear tests as well 
as long-range missile launches in return for significant U.S. “nutritional assistance.”27 
However, the deal was soon nullified by the North’s declaration that it would test a “satellite 
launch vehicle,” (SLV), then the actual, if failed, launch, and later a more successful 
December launch. In February 2013, just a week before Park’s inauguration, North Korea 
conducted its third nuclear test. Perhaps emboldened, Pyongyang threatened nuclear war 
with not only South Korea but also Japan and the United States. Pyongyang appears not 
to have the capability to actually carry out an attack on the United States, although it 
threatened to conduct a preemptive attack against it and South Korea in response to the 
two allies’ agreement of October 2013 on a new strategy for deterring nuclear and other 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) strikes by North Korea.28 Taking a more positive 
approach, from July 2013, North Korea appeared conciliatory for a time before turning 
more belligerent again.
What caused North Korea to zigzag? 1) China’s persuasion and pressure? 2) North Korea’s 
own economic necessity? or 3) Kim Jong-un regime’s internal power struggle? All three 
causes are intertwined to make coherent policy implementation more difficult. As evidence 
of the third argument, one need only cite the shocking news of Jang Sung-taek’s purge, in 
the aftermath of which, the domestic political situation appears even more complex and 
uncertain. Now North Korea is tightening control over the deeply troubled population 
because it senses that sympathy for Jang would endanger the regime. Mobilization to 
denounce Jang’s crimes reportedly took place nationwide. On the one hand, Kim Jong-un 
has frequently visited military installations to show off his strong grip on the military. 
On the other, Jang’s personal network—including his relatives and subordinates in the 
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party, the cabinet, and affiliated agencies—was arrested. Those in overseas missions 
were summoned back—all subject to varying severity of punishment from execution to 
imprisonment, depending on their degree of intimacy with Jang. These developments are 
indicative of North Korea’s political instability.
In the midst of this purge, Pyongyang relaunched its “peace offensive.” Starting from the 
New Year’s message, it removed harsh elements from its rhetoric and called for improving 
inter-Korean relations and reciprocally stopping slander and mudslinging. Since Pyongyang's 
"soft" gestures have often been followed by major provocations, discussion about how Seoul 
should respond was cautious. The North’s tactics appeared to be an attempt to soften its 
negative image in the United States and elsewhere.29 Seen in the context of its prior zigzag 
behavior, the pattern of provocation followed by conciliation is nothing new.
Recent Trends among the Surrounding Great Powers
There is widespread skepticism among U.S. policy elites about North Korea’s credibility after 
its abrogation of the “Leap Day” deal and the execution of Jang Sung-taek. Few think that 
conditions are ripe for the resumption of denuclearization talks with North Korea, let alone 
for its strategic turnabout. The United States will likely continue to put pressure on the North 
over the nuclear issue while trying to induce China to play a constructive role.30 Though it 
is difficult to determine whether Kim Jong-un’s power basis has solidified, the United States 
continues to keep its eye on the possibility of new North Korean provocations, even as there 
is mounting impatience for action both in the United States and from its partners in the region.
There is little chance for any U.S. reengagement in bilateral direct negotiations with the 
North to succeed. After past failed bilateral attempts, it prefers multilateral negotiations. 
Therefore, it is crucial for Park to strengthen policy coordination with Washington and seek 
together to develop principles for a multilateral approach. She can be confident now that 
Washington will not give Pyongyang the impression that it can take advantage of occasional 
bilateral contacts with the United States to try to drive a wedge between Seoul and it, as was 
the case at the time of the South Korea-U.S. perception gap (and thus policy gap) over North 
Korea under South Korea’s progressive governments.31
As for China, Beijing is inclined to see the purge of Jang Sung-taek as an internal problem 
and take a “business as usual” position. Yet, Sino-North Korean economic cooperation is 
troubled because many Chinese investors reportedly feel uneasy about their prospects since 
many of their North Korean counterparts—mostly Jang’s surrogates—were either purged or 
replaced.32 Also, Beijing seems noticeably irritated with recent developments, wary of losing 
its leverage over the Pyongyang regime. Over the past few years, China’s awareness of North 
Korean affairs, especially internal political dynamics, has been found to be deficient, lacking 
high-level channels with the leadership in Pyongyang.33 While it is clear that neither Beijing 
nor Pyongyang wants to damage their traditional relations, the former considers it essential 
for the latter not to engage in belligerent behavior and worries about the immature nature 
and unpredictability of Kim Jong-un. Though China expects Kim to stay in power for the 
foreseeable future, it also predicts a certain degree of political and socio-economic instability 
to ensue over the course of his power consolidation. Mending relations depends not only 
on whether Pyongyang exercises self-restraint, but also on how quickly and smoothly Kim 
finishes the “house-cleaning” within his leadership.
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Outside observers are closely observing the following issues in North Korea-China relations: 
a Kim Jong-un visit to China, North Korean nuclear and missile tests, North Korea’s 
border control with China, the PLA’s movements in the vicinity of the border area, Sino-
North Korean economic cooperation activities, and Beijing’s strategic calculations about 
Pyongyang. Kim will eventually visit China in restoring the traditional comradeship with 
his country’s only ally in the region, but North Korea is not expected to abandon its tandem 
strategy of simultaneously pursuing nuclear armaments and economic revitalization under 
his monolithic leadership.34 It is, thus, important for Park to continue to keep warm ties with 
Xi Jinping, coordinating her North Korean policy with him, as well as to urge China, as 
North Korea’s major sponsor, to play a greater role in solving the nuclear issue and involving 
the international community.
From Japan’s perspective, North Korea will experience political instability for some time 
due to Kim Jong-un’s unfinished power consolidation, his arbitrary decision-making style, 
and the apathetic attitude of his senior subordinates, who are now instinctively preoccupied 
with self-preservation. At present, there is no reason to believe that Japan has changed its 
policy, which basically aims to comprehensively resolve the North Korean nuclear and 
missile problems, as well as the abduction issue by maintaining sanctions and allowing for 
dialogue. Nevertheless, politicians in Tokyo, especially Abe and those around him, may hope 
to quickly settle the abduction issue rather than merely participating in the painstakingly 
slow multilateral process to produce a comprehensive resolution since he pledged to solve it 
during his term in office. It cannot be ruled out that Japan could try to strike a deal if it were 
to directly reengage with the Kim Jong-un regime. Abe sent Iijima Isao, a special advisor to 
the Cabinet Secretary, to Pyongyang in May 2013 to discuss the abduction issue with Kim 
Yong Nam without careful prior policy consultations with the other Six-Party Talks partners. 
This visit concerned both Seoul and Washington since any sudden progress in a Pyongyang-
Tokyo dialogue would be at odds with the close trilateral coordination on the North Korean 
issue they have sought. Tokyo’s uncoordinated, unilateral approach undercuts hope of 
making a breakthrough in the dormant Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of North 
Korea. The Korean Foreign Ministry openly stated that Iijima’s visit was “unhelpful.”35
Japan’s bilateral ties with South Korea and China, respectively, have been strained by the 
Abe administration’s increasingly aggressive and nationalistic posture on historical and 
territorial issues. Abe’s comments about Japan becoming a “normal state,” changing its peace 
Constitution, and revising two standing apologies to its neighbors (the Kono and Murayama 
statements) undermine Japan’s standing in the region.36 The United States is concerned about 
the escalating tension between its major allies. North Korea is predictably tempted to take 
advantage of Japan’s unilateral approach in order to drive a wedge between it and its allies. 
Close consultations with the United States are necessary to urge Japan not to act unilaterally.
As for Russia, Putin’s absolute power and keen interest in the development of the Russian 
Far East have not only put a spotlight on a strategic approach to Pyongyang, but also have led 
to the pursuit of joint business opportunities in North Korea. Even after Jang’s purge, there 
is no significant sign of a setback to bilateral economic cooperation with North Korea, and 
Pyongyang reportedly reaffirmed that Russian partners’ investments, including those in the 
Rajin-Khasan joint logistics venture, will not be affected. Although Russian observers say 
that Kim Jong-un needs more time to complete large-scale follow-up purges and generational 
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changes in the party, government, and the military, they are positive about the survival of his 
regime and the health of the bilateral relationship between North Korea and Russia.37 Since 
North Korea is likely to increase contacts with the Russian side in order to reconfigure the 
old northern triangle of North Korea, China, and Russia, there is a possibility of a Kim visit 
to Russia for a summit with Putin, should he find it difficult to visit Beijing first. Therefore, 
it is essential for Park to include Russia in her Northeast Asian regional strategy to address 
North Korean questions, whether nuclear threats, humanitarian issues, or economic reforms.
Trustpolitik as a Workable Goldilocks 
Strategy: What Should Be Done?
Through the catchword trustpolitik, Park has repeatedly expressed her desire to engage 
in the “peace process” for improving inter-Korean affairs, an operable manifestation of 
trustpolitik, which underscores South Korea’s proactive diplomatic initiatives to create 
favorable external conditions as a crucial prerequisite. Trustpolitik can be both a means 
to achieve peace and security on the peninsula and an end goal to be fulfilled by the peace 
process. The Park administration also claims that whereas the policies of past governments 
have gone from one extreme to another, her strategy is a policy of alignment, i.e., neither a 
coercive policy nor an appeasement policy, but rather an effective and balanced combination 
of contending or competing policy options, such as inter-Korean and foreign relations, 
pressure and dialogue, and deterrence and cooperation, while separating humanitarian 
issues from those related to politics and security.
With the possibility of increasing uncertainty and unrest in North Korea in recent months, 
questions have been raised about South Korea’s preparedness for contingency scenarios that 
could include regime change. There have been lots of predictions about political instability 
and regime collapse over the last 20 years, generating plans like CONPLAN 5029, a military 
contingency plan drafted by South Korea and the United States in 1999 for responding to 
sudden change, which was finally developed into an operational plan in 2009.38
Given geostrategic circumstances surrounding the peninsula and the unique resilience of the 
North Korean leadership,39 sudden collapse is unlikely in the foreseeable future, but there has 
been much speculation about how the Kim Jung-un regime would collapse.40 In this regards, 
there has been more discussion about how to prepare for it instead of mere predictions 
about the collapse itself.41 During her New Year press conference on January 6, 2014, Park 
mentioned “tongil daebak” (unification being the jackpot), which generated a hot debate over 
whether it would be a jackpot or crackpot. Due to the enormous economic burden (“tongil 
biyong” unification costs), a growing number of South Koreans have begun to consider this 
long-desired prospect as not only improbable, but also undesirable. Others claim that “bundan 
biyong” (division costs) are equally exorbitant, if not greater, because North Korea’s perilous 
and unpredictable actions have often generated a “Korea discount” in the global market and 
hurt South Korea’s overall image in the international community. Ordinary South Korean 
citizens also do not wish to tolerate any longer the uncertain environment arising from the 
North’s provocations. Meanwhile, Pyongyang charged that Park’s comment was “fueled by 
delusions about unification by absorption.”42
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Considering that the ultimate objective of Park’s peace process and trustpolitik is peaceful 
unification that would be “daebak” not only for the Koreas but for all of Northeast Asia, as 
she said in Davos in late January, there is reason to pursue new approaches to North Korea. 
First, the South’s strategic communications and policy coordination with the United States 
and China are important to prepare for possible scenarios on the Korean Peninsula. For 
this, information sharing with these states and international consensus on handling unstable 
situations are desirable, deepening the ‘2+2’ information-sharing formula between South 
Korean and U.S. diplomatic and military authorities and more actively consulting with the 
epistemic community at the regional level in analyzing North Korea’s power restructuring 
trends and developing indicators for measuring its instability would be instrumental.
Second, independent of North Korea’s nuclear crisis, its human rights problems and 
humanitarian crisis such as food shortages, political prisoners’ camps, and refugee issues 
should be continually addressed on the international stage. The Park administration needs to 
develop strategies for how to take full advantage of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights in North Korea, which released its report about "unspeakable atrocities" committed in 
the country and called for the international community's responsibility to protect the North 
Korean people from crimes against humanity,43 the United Nation’s Human Rights resolution 
targeting the North Korean regime, and other international human rights NGO activities. 
Third, the administration should seek ways to effectively build an international consensus for 
the eventual unification of the two Koreas. Employing various Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track 
2 approaches is necessary, although, using direct government channels with China requires 
caution. During 2013, Park had a total of 27 summit meetings, including the ones with four 
great powers, and foreign ministers’ meetings were more frequent. It is important to develop 
follow-up measures based on Park’s linkage of trustpolitik and the peace process to NAPCI.
What I call Park’s “middle of the road policy” needs to be reconsidered for its effectiveness. 
If her North Korean policy takes the safe road of not rocking the boat, she needs to face 
criticism, as Obama has, of being too wary and ineffectual in forging a breakthrough for rocky 
inter-Korean relations. A step-by-step approach towards developing the Goldilocks diplomatic 
strategy in the short and long-term should be clearly presented. The short-term should be a 
stepping-stone approach. In retrospect, there has been a plethora of ambitious and grandiose 
rhetoric in dealing with North Korean problems. To be fair, previous administrations in South 
Korea and the United States alike made considerable efforts to bring about the denuclearization 
of North Korea. However, with a lack of clear understanding about the desirable end state on 
the Korean Peninsula and the methodology to arrive there, they hastily attempted a variety 
of “comprehensive solutions.” For instance, the George W. Bush administration proclaimed 
it was ready to take a “bold approach” to meet what it considered to be Pyongyang’s needs, 
including negative security assurance and economic incentives in exchange for North Korea 
abandoning its nuclear weapons programs in a comprehensive fashion. Policy makers in 
Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington each had their own initiatives, which were varied in name but 
not-so-different in essence—a “package deal.”
Roh Moo-hyun’s “peace regime” and Bush’s “complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
denuclearization” (CVID) are well-known examples. Although the merits of such deals 
should not to be ignored, North Korea’s notorious “salami tactics” proved to be particularly 
tricky to overcome. The Lee government’s “Vision 3000” was not so different in this regard. 
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When the decades-long effort turned out to be a series of failures, it was clear to everyone 
that a major paradigm shift or a “game changer” in dealing with the North was absolutely 
necessary. Park’s trustpolitik strives to avoid this past pattern.
Longer term planning should be related to preparation for unification, building an international 
consensus for this. North Korean refugees and humanitarian issues should not be put aside. 
South Korean decision makers may have to reconsider their previous “low profile” approach 
to these issues. South Korea can take valuable lessons from German unification, where 
the East German government did not merely change, it collapsed completely from within. 
Purely in order to ease the suffering of partition, the two sides negotiated with one another. 
They did not cooperate with one another, though the West was a dialogue partner for the 
East. Similarly, as reconciliation with the North Korean dictatorship proceeds, a regime that 
gravely represses its people must not be a collaborative partner. A national coalition cannot 
be formed between a free market system and a dictatorship that, at least on the outside, calls 
itself socialist. A unification strategy must be formed from this perspective. In educating 
young South Koreans about unification, the Park administration must acknowledge that the 
regime of Kim Jong-un does not represent the will of the North Korean people. They are 
taking the people hostage, and are not to be viewed as a party for cooperation. In this way, 
the next generation will take an interest in North Korean human rights and democratization.
Conclusion
When new South Korean presidents are elected, it has been common for North Korea to 
make threats and provocations as it tests the new administration, but eventually the North 
takes conciliatory measures that can easily turn into another round of hostile acts. The Park 
administration has been prepared with a sustainable and resilient policy, both in its direct 
dealings with the North and in its close consultations with the international community. 
Nearly all previous efforts to reach an agreement with North Korea have failed to achieve 
meaningful accomplishments because Seoul had adhered to a negotiating principle of 
reaching a collective, comprehensive, and grand bargain, that was countered by North 
Korea’s salami tactics and other strategies to stall progress. Learning from these experiences, 
Park has been trying to build trust between the two Koreas, but with Pyongyang’s continuous 
provocations, her approach has not been successful in achieving its objectives.44
It is therefore better to strive for small but meaningful results in the short term, while also 
building on these achievements to move forward towards the ultimate goal in the mid to 
long term. In order to cultivate an environment for unification, Seoul needs to concentrate 
on cooperating with the international community and building global consensus and support 
for unification, while simultaneously dealing with issues in North Korea, not only traditional 
military issues, but also human rights and humanitarian assistance.
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